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The use of linearly independent signal states in realistic im-
plementations of quantum key distribution (qkd) enables an
eavesdropper to perform unambiguous state discrimination.
We explore quantitatively the limits for secure qkd imposed
by this fact taking into account that the receiver can monitor
to some extend the photon number statistics of the signals
even with todays standard detection schemes. We compare
our attack to the beamsplitting attack and show that secu-
rity against beamsplitting attack does not necessarily imply
security against the attack considered here.
03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz, 42.79.Sz
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (qkd) is a technique to pro-
vide two parties with a secure, secret and shared key.
Such a key is the necessary ingredient to the only provably
secure way to communicate with guaranteed privacy, the
one-time pad or Vernam cipher [1]. The first complete
protocol was given by Bennett and Brassard [2] (BB84)
following first ideas by Wiesner [3]. It uses the fact
that any channel which transmits two non-orthogonal
states perfectly, automatically makes eavesdropping on
this channel detectable.
We consider the BB84 protocol in a typical quantum
optical implementation. Ideally, Alice sends a sequence
of single photons which are at random polarized in one
of the following four states: right or left circular polar-
ized, or vertically or horizontally polarized. Bob chooses
at random between two polarization analyzers, one dis-
tinguishing the circular polarized states, and the other
distinguishing the linear polarized states. Following a
public discussion about the basis of the sent signals and
the measurement apparatus applied to them, sender and
receiver can obtain a shared key made up from those
signals where the measurement device gives determinis-
tic results. This is the sifted key [4]. Proofs of security
of this scheme against the most general attack, even in
the presence of noise, have been obtained [5–7]. In this
article we follow another goal: we would like to illumi-
nate to which extend already very simple attacks can
render qkd impossible once realistic imperfections like
lossy lines and non-ideal signal states are taken into ac-
count. The difficulties implied, for example, by the use
of weak coherent states in combination with lossy lines
has been pointed out earlier [8–10] and this subject has
been illuminated in depth in [11], where bounds on cov-
erable distances are given. Positive security proofs for
sufficiently short distances and taking into account the
realistic signals are given for individual attacks [12] and
coherent attacks [13]. The eavesdropping attacks which
crack the secrecy of the key for set-ups exceeding this
secure distances are still quite complicated. The eaves-
dropper needs to perform a QND measurement on the
total photon number of the signal, then he has to split a
photon off the occurring multi-photon signals [11], store
that photon, and then, finally, measure it after the public
discussion.
In this paper we are looking into much simpler eaves-
dropping strategies which make use of the opportunities
arising from lossy lines and non-ideal signals. Such an
attack has been proposed by Bennett [14] and Yuen [9].
It uses the fact that Eve can, with finite probability, dis-
criminate the four signal states unambiguously. When-
ever such a discrimination is performed successfully, the
eavesdropper knows immediately which of the four sig-
nal states was sent and can send this information via a
classical channel to Bob’s detector, in front of which she
places a state preparation machine to prepare the iden-
tified state. This way this state does not experience the
losses of the actual quantum channel without that Eve
has to invest into a perfect quantum channel.
The investigation of this scenario refines Bennett’s and
Yuen’s analysis since it takes into account that, to a cer-
tain extend, the photon statistics of the signals arriving
at Bob’s detectors can be monitored. The results illumi-
nate the restrictions placed on implementations of qkd
on lines with strong losses. Thereby we can show that
the currently widely used conditional security standard
of security against beamsplitting attacks [14] is incom-
plete. Especially, contrary to common belief, the use
of unambiguous state discrimination can be a more effi-
cient eavesdropping strategy than the beamsplitting at-
tack, even for dim coherent states.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we reca-
pitulate the principles of unambiguous state discrimina-
tion. These are applied in Sec. III to the signal states in
the BB84 protocol with dim coherent signal states. In
Sec. IV we introduce an eavesdropping attack based on
unambiguous state discrimination (usd attack) and an-
alyze it in detail, taking the photon number distribution
of the signals arriving at Bob’s detectors into account. In
Sec. V we discuss the relation between the beam splitting
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attack and the usd attack. Sec. VI concludes the article
with a short summary.
II. UNAMBIGUOUS DISCRIMINATION OF
SIGNAL STATES
Unambiguous state discrimination is possible whenever
the N states in question are linearly independent. The
problem can be described by a measurement which can
give the results “state 0”, “state 1”, . . . “state N−1”, and
the result “don’t know”. The constraint is that the mea-
surement results should never wrongly identify a state,
and the goal is to keep the fraction of “don’t know” re-
sults as low as possible. This problem has been investi-
gated by Ivanovic [15] for the case of two equal probable
non-orthogonal states. Peres [16] solved this problem in a
formulation with Probability Operator Measures (POM).
Later Jaeger and Shimony [17] extended the solution to
arbitrary a priori probabilities. Peres’s solution has been
generalized to an arbitrary number of equally probable
states which are generated from each other by a symme-
try operator by Chefles and Barnett [18]. Their result
can be summarized as follows: the symmetry allows to
write the input states in the form
|Ψk〉 =
N−1∑
j=0
cj exp
(
2πi
k j
N
)
|φj〉 , (1)
where the states |φj〉 represent some set of or-
thonormal states. Note that the states
∣∣∣Ψ˜ℓ〉 =
1√
N
∑N−1
j=0 exp
(
2πi ℓ jN
)
|φj〉 form another orthonormal
set. It turns out that the optimal strategy for unam-
biguous state discrimination consists of two steps. In the
first step a filter operation is performed such that the
output states are either the orthonormal states
∣∣∣Ψ˜ℓ〉 or
some linear dependent states. This step can be described
by a complete positive map with the two Kraus opera-
tors. They are defined with the help of the minimum
coefficient cmin = minj |cj | as
Ayes =
N−1∑
j=0
cmin
cj
|φj〉 〈φj |, (2)
Ano =
N−1∑
j=0
√
1− c
2
min
|cj |2 |φj〉 〈φj |. (3)
The conditional state in the event of successful filtering
is now given as ∣∣∣Ψ(yes)k 〉 = √Ncmin ∣∣∣Ψ˜k〉 .
In a second step, we can perform a von Neumann pro-
jection measurement on this state to identify unambigu-
ously the state k via the orthonormal state
∣∣∣Ψ˜k〉. The
probability of this successful identification is given by
PD = N min
j
|cj |2. (4)
For the case of two equal probable non-orthogonal polar-
ization states of a single photon a quantum optical im-
plementation following this two-step idea has been given
by Huttner et al. [19] and by Brandt [20].
III. SIGNAL STATES
A first description of realistic signal states is that of
a coherent state with a small amplitude α. This corre-
sponds to the description of a dimmed laser pulse. The
coherent state is given by
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
(αa†)n
n!
|0〉 (5)
where a† is the creation operator for one of the four BB84
polarizations which can be expressed in terms of two cre-
ation operators b†1 and b
†
2 (corresponding, e.g., to two
linear orthogonal polarizations) as
a†0 =
1√
2
(
b†1 + b
†
2
)
, (6)
a†1 =
1√
2
(
b†1 + i b
†
2
)
, (7)
a†2 =
1√
2
(
b†1 − b†2
)
, (8)
a†3 =
1√
2
(
b†1 − i b†2
)
. (9)
In terms of these two modes the signal state become
therefore
|Ψ0〉 =
∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉 ∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉
, (10)
|Ψ1〉 =
∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉 ∣∣∣∣i α√2
〉
, (11)
|Ψ2〉 =
∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉 ∣∣∣∣− α√2
〉
, (12)
|Ψ3〉 =
∣∣∣∣ α√2
〉 ∣∣∣∣−i α√2
〉
. (13)
We can calculate the values of the cj in terms of the
overlaps of the four states according to the formula [18]
|cj | = 1
N2
∑
k,ℓ
exp
[
−2πi j(k − ℓ)
N
]
〈Ψk|Ψℓ〉
and find as a function of the expected photon number
µ = |α|2
|c0| = 1√
2
e−
µ
4
√
cosh
µ
2
+ cos
µ
2
, (14)
2
|c1| = 1√
2
e−
µ
4
√
sinh
µ
2
+ sin
µ
2
, (15)
|c2| = 1√
2
e−
µ
4
√
cosh
µ
2
− cos µ
2
, (16)
|c3| = 1√
2
e−
µ
4
√
sinh
µ
2
− sin µ
2
. (17)
The minimum of these four functions depends on the
value of µ. The four functions 4|ck|2 are plotted in Fig. 1
from where we can read off PD as the minimum.
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FIG. 1. The fourfold weight 4|cj |
2 of the four canonical
states |φj〉 as a function of the mean photon number µ. The
lower bound of these four curves gives the optimum probabil-
ity for unambiguous state discrimination.
It turns out, however, that for realistic sources these
states are not the correct description of the situation.
The reason is that Eve does not have a phase reference,
that means that for a given polarization she does not
see the coherent state |α〉 but the phase averaged density
matrix 12π
∫
φ
|eiφα〉〈eiφα| dφ. This results in signal states
which are mixtures of Fock states with a Poissonian pho-
ton number distribution described by the density matrix
ρ = e−µ
∑
n
µn
n!
|n〉 〈n|. (18)
Here the state |n〉 denotes the Fock state with n photons
in one of the four BB84 polarization states. The optimal
strategy to discriminate between the four possible den-
sity matrices can be logically decomposed into a QND
measurement on the total photon number in the modes
b1 and b2 together and a following measurement which
unambiguously discriminates between the four resulting
conditional states for each total photon number. The
justification for this is that the total photon number via
the QND measurement “comes free”, since the execution
of this measurement does not change the signal states.
However, given the resulting information, we know the
optimal strategy on the conditional states according to
[18]. Therefore we find that the total probability of un-
ambiguous state discrimination PD is given in terms of
the respective probabilities for each photon number sub-
space P
(n)
D as
PD =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
P
(n)
D . (19)
The conditional states resulting from the QND measure-
ment and corresponding to n photons in total satisfy
again the symmetry condition which allows to apply the
results by Chefles and Barnett. We find for the four co-
efficients (as a function of the photon number n > 0) the
expressions
|c0| =
√
1
4
+ 2−(1+n/2) cos
(π
4
n
)
, (20)
|c1| =
√
1
4
+ 2−(1+n/2) sin
(π
4
n
)
, (21)
|c2| =
√
1
4
− 2−(1+n/2) cos
(π
4
n
)
, (22)
|c3| =
√
1
4
− 2−(1+n/2) sin
(π
4
n
)
. (23)
Therefore the maximum probability of unambiguous
state discrimination for fixed value of n is given by
P
(n)
D =


0 n ≤ 2
1− 21−n/2 n even
1− 2(1−n)/2 n odd.
(24)
It is possible to sum up the contributions from different
photon numbers from the Poissonian distribution and we
obtain the expression
PD =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
P
(n)
D
= 1− e−µ
(√
2 sinh
µ√
2
+ 2 cosh
µ√
2
− 1
)
. (25)
This result is compared to the result for coherent states
in Fig. 2. As expected, the probability for unambiguous
state identification is lower for the mixture of Fock-states
than for the coherent states. An expansion in terms of the
photon number µ gives PD =
1
12µ
3 +O(µ4) for both sit-
uations. For lower than third order the signal states are
not linearly independent, so that no unambiguous state
discrimination is possible. Note that an actual implemen-
tation does not necessarily need to follow the decompo-
sition into a QND and another measurement. We just
need to implement one generalized measurement. Actu-
ally, Bennett et al. [14] and Yuen [9] gave a simple beam-
splitter setup which obtains a discrimination probability
of PD =
1
32µ
3 +O(µ4).
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FIG. 2. Comparison of the optimum probability of unam-
biguous states discrimination for coherent states and for the
corresponding mixture of Fock states. Both have the same
Poissonian photon number distribution with mean photon
number µ.
IV. UNAMBIGUOUS STATE DISCRIMINATION
AS EAVESDROPPING STRATEGY
We now consider the realistic situation that Alice uses
the phase-averaged coherent states as signal states which
are described by a Poissonian photon number distribu-
tion with mean photon number µ. In this scenario we
fix our eavesdropping strategy, to which we refer as the
unambiguous state discrimination attack (usd attack) as
follows: The unambiguous state discrimination allows
Eve to identify a fraction of the signals without error.
For this fraction, she can prepare a corresponding state
close to Bob’s detectors such that no errors appear for
these signals. Whenever the identification does not suc-
ceed, she sends the vacuum signal to Bob to avoid errors,
which therefore will not be relevant in the considered sce-
nario.
We need to study this strategy under realistic con-
straint. An important constraint is that the transmit-
tance of the quantum channel connecting both parties
is given by the transmission efficiency ηL. We consider
a detection setup where Bob monitors each polarization
mode in the chosen basis by one detector. These detec-
tors have a finite detection efficiency ηB , in which we
include any additional loss on Bob’s side, e.g. from a
polarizing beamsplitter. The detectors are modeled as
“yes/no” detectors, which either fire, or they do not fire;
they cannot distinguish the number of impinging pho-
tons.
It is clear that once Eve identified a signal she is in-
terested to produce a signal in the corresponding polar-
ization such that Bob will detect it despite his inefficient
detectors. One strategy is to send a stronger signal than
the original one in the correct polarization. This will
work as long as Bob measures in the polarization basis
which includes the signal polarization (sifted key), but
it will lead to an increased coincidence rate of clicks in
both of Bob’s detectors otherwise. Our analysis extends
previous analysis to include the additional constraint put
on the eavesdropping strategy by the fact that Bob ob-
serves not only the rate of clicks of one or the other de-
tector, but also the rate of events when both detectors
fire, each monitoring one of the orthogonal polarization
modes. The latter event will be observed ideally only
when Alice and Bob use different bases, independently
of the presence of absence of an eavesdropper. Eve’s aim
is to reproduce these two observables with the minimum
number of non-vacuum signals to make efficient use of
the successfully identified signals.
In the absence of Eve, whenever Alice and Bob use the
same polarization basis Bob’s expects to find at most one
detector clicks; the probability of a click is
P¯1 = 1− exp(−ηLηBµ), (26)
as follows from the Poissonian photon-number statistics
of coherent states.
Whenever Alice and Bob use different bases a double-
click may occur; its probability is
P¯2 =
[
1− exp
(
−ηLηBµ
2
)]2
. (27)
What happens in the presence of Eve depends on the
signals Eve sends for the successfully detected Alice’s sig-
nals. It is clear that Eve can avoid the occurrence of dou-
ble clicks when Alice and Bob measure in the same basis,
since she unambiguously determined the signal. There-
fore it is not useful to monitor the double click rate when
Alice and Bob use the same basis.
Note that we do not need to include detector dark
count rates or errors due to misalignment into account.
The reason for that is that we will investigate the limit
when the usd attack gives complete information to Eve
while it reproduces the expected probabilities P¯1 and P¯2.
The values of these probabilities in the absence of an
eavesdropper and the reproduced values resulting from a
successful usd attack will be affected in the same way by
the error mechanisms of dark counts and misalignment
etc., so that the resulting real observed rates will still be
indistinguishable.
A. Eve sends n-photon states
Let us suppose now, that whenever Eve succeeds in the
unambiguous state discrimination she sends a number
state (with correct polarization) containing N photons
to Bob. If she fails she simply sends no photon.
If Alice and Bob use the same basis, at most one of two
Bob’s detectors will click. The probability of this event
is given by
P
(N)
1 = PD
[
1−
(
m
0
)
η0B(1− ηB)N
]
= PD
[
1− (1− ηB)N
]
. (28)
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This is the probability that one detector clicks if a state
|N〉 comes, multiplied by the probability that Eve suc-
ceeds in usd (and sends |N〉).
If Alice and Bob use different bases, we can think of the
photons as being equally and independently distributed
to both Bob’s detectors. The probability to find k pho-
tons at the first detector and ℓ photons at the second
one (with included detection efficiencies) is given by the
formula
Πkℓ = PD
(
1
2
)N N−ℓ∑
m=k
(
N
m
)[(
m
k
)
ηkB(1− ηB)m−k
]
×
[(
N −m
ℓ
)
ηℓB(1− ηB)N−m−ℓ
]
.
where the summation limits stem from obvious con-
straints m ≥ k,N − m ≥ ℓ. Thus the probability of
double click in Bob’s “yes-no” detectors when Eve is ac-
tive and while Alice and Bob use different polarization
bases reads
P
(N)
2 = PD
[
1−
N∑
ℓ=0
Π0ℓ −
N∑
k=0
Πk0 +Π00
]
,
(note that Π00 would be subtracted two times). Be-
cause of the symmetry of the configuration, obviously,∑N
ℓ=0 Π0ℓ =
∑N
k=0 Πk0. With the expressions
Π00 = PD(1− ηB)N ,
N∑
k=0
Πk0 = PD
N∑
m=0
(
N
m
)
2−N
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
ηkB(1 − ηB)N−k
= PD
(
1− ηB
2
)N
we obtain finally for the double-click probability
P
(N)
2 = PD
[
1− 2
(
1− ηB
2
)N
+ (1− ηB)N
]
. (29)
B. Eve sends a mixture of number states
Of course, there is no reason to restrict Eve only to
the use of number states. After successful state discrim-
ination she can send to Bob any pure state or mixture.
However, from Bob’s point of view these signals are effec-
tively mixtures of photon number states because of the
nature of his detectors (they may be described by the
pair of projectors: Pno = |0〉〈0| and Pyes =
∑∞
n=1 |n〉〈n|).
Therefore it is sufficient to analyze only a mixture of pho-
ton number states in the polarization of the identified sig-
nal, so that only the photon number statistics remains to
be chosen by Eve.
As already mentioned, Bob is interested only in the
number of single clicks (in case that his and Alice’s bases
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FIG. 3. Diagram displaying relations between “sin-
gle-click” and “double-click” probabilities. The highlighted
area contains all possible combinations of Bob’s detection
probabilities stemming from Eve’s activity (described in the
text) for a given detection efficiency (here, particularly,
ηB = 0.5) and a given mean photon number in states sent by
Alice (µ = 4). It is a region of insecure key generation. The
shape of the area depends on ηB , the scaling on µ [through
discrimination probability PD(µ)]. The separate dotted curve
represents a set of all possible “working points” without an
eavesdropper, i.e. a set of all possible pairs of expected P¯1 and
P¯2. Any particular position of a working point depends on the
values of the line transmittance (ηL), the detection efficiency
(ηB), and the mean photon number (µ). The value of µ = 4
is chosen to make the diagram well readable. The structure
is the same for lower, realistic values.
coincide) and double clicks (if the bases differ). One
can plot very illustrative diagram displaying relations be-
tween corresponding single-click and double-click proba-
bilities (see Fig. 3).
The situation where Eve sends number states to Bob
is represented by a dot for each value of the photon
number N . The positions of these dots have been cal-
culated for fixed values of ηL and µ. Coordinates of a
point corresponding to any mixture of number states can
always be expressed as a linear convex combination of
coordinates corresponding to individual number states.
Because of the convexity of the above mentioned curve
all such points must lie inside (or on the boundary) of
the polygon with vertices at the points corresponding to
number states (i.e. in the area highlighted in Fig. 3).
We can explicitly prove the convexity of the bound-
ary formed by the points for fixed photon number.
The points with x-coordinate P
(N)
1 [Eq. (28)] and y-
coordinate P
(N)
2 [Eq. (29)] lie on a continuous curve
which can be expressed with help of Eq. (28) by a real
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continuation of the parameter N as
N =
ln(1 − x/PD)
ln(1 − ηB) .
Substituting into Eq. (29) we obtain the explicit equation
of the curve
y =
[
2− 2
(
1− x
PD
)κ
− x
PD
]
PD, (30)
where
κ =
ln(1− ηB/2)
ln(1− ηB) .
Calculating the second derivative of Eq. (30) with respect
to x and using the fact that ηL, ηB, and x/PD take val-
ues in the interval between 0 and 1, it follows that the
curve given by Eq. (30) is convex. This proves that the
highlighted area in Fig. 3 is indeed convex.
C. Insecure parameter regime
The convex area defined in the previous section can be
called a region of insecurity. We define the working point
of a setup as the the point whose coordinates are given
by expected values in the absence of an eavesdropper. If
this working point falls into the region of insecurity, Eve
can get complete information on the key without a risk
of being disclosed.
The set of all possible working points is represented
by the dotted curve in the diagram. Expected single-
click probability P¯1 [Eq. (28)] represents x-coordinate,
expected double-click probability P¯2 [Eq. (29)] represents
y-coordinate. From Eq. (26) the exponential can be ex-
pressed and substituted into Eq. (27). Thus the explicit
equation of the working point curve reads
y =
[
1− (1 − x)1/2
]2
. (31)
We have to answer the question for which values of
parameters ηL, ηB, and µ the working point lies in the
region of insecurity.
1. Necessary condition for insecurity
If the expected probability of single clicks satisfies
P¯1 > P
(N)
1 for all N then the working point will certainly
not fall to the region of insecurity, which is clearly illus-
trated in Fig. 3. This leads to the necessary condition for
insecurity given by P¯1 < PD. To evaluate the implication
for the experimental parameters, we substitute Eq. (26)
ηLηB <
− ln[1− PD(µ)]
µ
. (32)
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FIG. 4. If the value of expected single-click probability is
greater then the discrimination probability (P¯1 > PD) the
described usd attack can be, in principle, detected. The plot
shows an example of a curve separating the set of values of
total efficiencies (ηLηB) and mean photon numbers (in states
sent by Alice) satisfying the above constraint [see inequality
(32)].
An analysis of this expression shows that for a fixed ex-
pected photon number µ a system cannot be cracked by
an usd attack if the total transmission efficiency ηLηB
is higher than a certain threshold which depends on the
the expected photon number µ. This dependence is eval-
uated numerically in Fig. 4. The surprising aspect is,
that the threshold does not go to 1 as µ goes to infinity.
Instead we find
(ηLηB)
(∞) = lim
µ→∞
− ln[1− PD(µ)]
µ
= (1− 2−1/2) ≈ 0.293. (33)
This shows, that that the implementation of quan-
tum cryptography with weak coherent states cannot be
cracked completely by the usd attack for all values of the
expected photon number µ as long as the total transmis-
sion satisfies ηLηB ≥ 1− 2−1/2.
2. Sufficient condition of insecurity
In this section we will derive precise conditions deter-
mining when a working point falls into the region of inse-
curity. In a first step we will show that for parameters of
practical applications it is sufficient to consider the sce-
nario the working point falls below the straight line going
through the origin and the vertex N = 2. This condition
corresponds to
xw ≥ yw x2
y2
. (34)
The coordinates of points used in this condition are de-
fined in Tab. I. In the second step we can then determine
whether in this scenario the working point lies inside or
6
Working point: xw = yw =
1− exp(−ηLηBµ)
[
1− exp
(
− ηLηBµ
2
)]
2
Vertex N = 1: x1 = PDηB y1 = 0
Vertex N = 2: x2 = PD(2ηB − η
2
B) y2 = PDη
2
B/2
TABLE I. Coordinates of selected points in the parameter
space of “observables”, which are the probabilities of single
clicks (x) and double clicks (y) in Bob’s detectors.
outside the region of insecurity by checking on which side
of the line going through the vertices N = 1 and N = 2
it lies (see Fig 3). If it lies on the left, qkd is insecure.
This corresponds to the inequality
xw ≤ yw x2 − x1
y2
+ x1. (35)
First, let us turn to the inequality (34). Substitut-
ing expressions for all coordinates according to Tab. I
one obtains an inequality which is quadratic in the vari-
able R = exp (−ηLηBµ/2) with the parameter ηB . We
find that the working point lies below the line connect-
ing vertices N = 0 and N = 2 if R ∈
(
4−3ηB
4−ηB , 1
)
. Thus
the mean photon number in coherent states sent by Alice
must be lower than a threshold µ2 given by
µ < µ2 =
−2
ηLηB
ln
(
4− 3ηB
4− ηB
)
. (36)
We find that µ2 ∈ [1/ηL, 2 ln 3/ηL] for any ηB and, es-
pecially, always µ2 ≥ 1. As we can see, this condition
is satisfied in all current experiments and does not pose
a serious restriction to the validity of our analysis espe-
cially for non negligible loss.
Now let us turn our attention to the condition (35)
which, whenever condition (36) is fulfilled, determines
whether the working point is in the region of insecurity.
It can be expressed in the following form
F (µ, ηL, ηB) := xwηB − 2yw(1− ηB)− PDη2B ≤ 0, (37)
Due to the complicated dependence of PD on µ we failed
to find its analytical solution. The analytical statement
we can do without any extra approximation is based on
the observation that
∂F
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
µ=0
= ηLη
2
B > 0 and F (0, ηL, ηB) = 0.
This implies that there exists always a range of values
for µ starting from µ = 0 for which we have F > 0, i.e.
the security of the key distribution cannot be cracked
completely by the usd attack.
It is easy to evaluate condition (37) numerically. In
Fig. 5 we give an example for the values of line transmit-
tance ηL = 0.1 and detection efficiency ηB = 0.5 (so that
µ2 ≈ 13.46). In this particular case, the transmission
becomes insecure in about 2.07 photons. It is not com-
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FIG. 5. The sign of the function F (µ, ηL, ηB) is a criterion
for the security (positive) or insecurity (negative) of the the
quantum key distribution with respect to the usd attack. The
line transmittance and Bob’s detection efficiency are fixed:
ηL = 0.1, ηB = 0.5. Mean photon number, µ, goes from
zero to µ2 limit. If F is negative the transmission is totally
insecure. The zero point lies at µ ≈ 2.07 photons.
pletely satisfying to have to fall back to numerical meth-
ods to investigate the security against the usd attack.
Fortunately, it is possible to get some analytic results in
a situation which is relevant to applications.
3. Partly accessible loss in a system with large loss
The results of the previous sections illuminate to which
extend Eve can achieve perfect eavesdropping by making
an unambiguous state discrimination measurement fol-
lowed by sending the identified signals directly to Bob’s
detectors, thereby bypassing the lossy quantum channel.
However, Eve does not necessarily need to access the
whole lossy quantum channel to be successful. By ac-
cessing we mean, that Eve can avoid these losses either
by replacing a quantum channel by a perfect, loss-free
one, or by replacing it by classical communication and
state preparation. The formulas of the previous sections
still apply if we collect in the quantity ηB all those losses
on the way to Bob’s detector which are not accessible
to Eve, while ηL denotes now only that loss that is ac-
cessible to her. It is instructive to look at the limit of
high non-accessible losses (ηB ≪ 1). In that case we can
approximate the function F of equation (37) by
F ≈ η2B
(
ηLµ− 1
2
η2Lµ
2 − PD
)
. (38)
The insecurity criterion F ≤ 0 in the region µ < µ2 (from
Eqn. (36)) then leads to the condition
ηL ≤ 1
µ
(
1−
√
1− 2PD
)
, (39)
which is independent of ηB. It can be approximated by
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ηL ≤ ηcritL ≈
PD
µ
≈ 1
12
µ2. (40)
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FIG. 6. The secure parameter regime for the losses acces-
sible to Eve for large Bob’s losses (ηB ≪ 1) is the region
above the solid line (F > 0). In the region with F ≤ 0 and
µ < µ2 the system is insecure. In the remaining region we
have F ≤ 0, but since µ > µ2, we cannot make any definitive
statements about security.
Condition (39) is shown in Fig. 6 as a solid line. To
make statements about security against the usd attack,
we need to consider additionally condition (36), which
can be approximated by µ < 1ηL in leading order of ηB
and is shown as a dashed line. We now can conclude that
the system is secure against usd attacks in the regime of
small detection efficiencies ηB if we are in the parameter
region with F > 0 and µ < µ2. Furthermore, the system
is insecure in the region F ≤ 0 and µ < µ2. For the
region with µ > µ2 we can only make indirect statements.
One is, that if the system is secure for a pair of values
(µ, ηL), then it must be secure for all values (µ, η
′
L) with
η′L > ηL, otherwise Eve could gain an advantage by not
accessing all the loss available to her. Therefore the only
region about which we cannot make a statement with the
present calculation is the region with µ > 4.1 and ηL >
1
µ .
Here more detailed calculation would be necessary.
Note that these considerations are valid for ηB ≪ 1
and only in this limit ηB does no longer play any role.
For higher values of ηB this changes.
D. Remark to the statistical nature of the problem
One should keep in mind that all of Bob’s measure-
ments have a statistical character. Bob does not measure
probabilities but finite numbers of clicks which naturally
fluctuates. In practice Bob must set certain limits of a
“confidential interval” of acceptable numbers of detector
clicks. This effects that in some cases Bob will reject the
transmission even if no eavesdropper is present. A more
serious implication is that there is always some non-zero
probability that Eve will not be detected even if the work-
ing point lies outside the insecurity region.
Note that Eve does not need to eavesdrop all the time
– she may let pass a fraction of the signal sequence with-
out any intervention. Her (deterministic) information on
the key decreases with this strategy. But both Bob’s
single- and double-click probabilities also change. The
point corresponding to such an eavesdropping strategy
(in the diagram as in Fig. 3) shifts along the straight line
connecting “full-time” Eve’s strategy point with Alice’s
and Bob’s working point. The relative shift equals the
fraction of transmission during which Eve is active.
For practical purposes it would be necessary to deter-
mine the probability that Eve’s information on the key
(due to the usd attack) will be smaller than a certain
chosen limit, as a function of the limits of the confiden-
tial interval and of the length of the key. This represents
a challenge for the further research in this field.
V. USD ATTACK VERSUS BEAMSPLITTING
ATTACK
Traditionally, security against the beamsplitting at-
tack [14] has been used as a practical level of security.
In the beamsplitting attack the lossy line is replaced by
an ideal loss-free line complemented by a beamsplitter
such that the total loss of the original line is reproduced.
The eavesdropper stores any photons coming out of the
free arm of the beamsplitter. Whenever the eavesdrop-
per and the receiver obtain a photon, which is possible
for multi-photon signals, Eve can measure her signal after
she learns the polarization basis in the public announce-
ment and she will learn thereby the bit value of these
signals completely.
It is interesting to note that security against beamsplit-
ting attack suggests that one can obtain a secure key even
for large average photon numbers. In the absence of er-
rors, the gain rate of secure key bits per signal bit can be
approximated in a way similar to that used in [12] for the
optimal individual attack. This approximation is given
by
GBS =
1
2
(pexp − psplit) , (41)
where the factor 1/2 stems from discarding signals with
unequal polarization basis. Then pexp is the probability
that Bob receives a signal, while psplit is the joint proba-
bility that Eve learned the bit value of a signal and that
the signal is received by Bob. To point out the basic prob-
lem of the beamsplitting attack it is sufficient to consider
the case of ηB = 1 and of coherent states. Then we find
for Poissonian photon statistics and a transmission rate
η of the system
pexp = 1− exp(−ηµ), (42)
psplit = pexp {1− exp [−(1− η)µ]} , (43)
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GBS =
1
2
exp(−(1− η)µ) [1− exp(−ηµ)] , (44)
which is always positive. Actually, the optimum is ob-
tained for µ ≈ 1. It is clear from our analysis, however,
that for large values of µ and typical loss rates, the usd
attack will render the quantum key distribution protocol
completely insecure.
The awareness of this problem is low, and it is thought
that it can be avoided by complementing the beamsplit-
ting attack with the additional requirement to keep the
average photon number low, much lower than 1, as to
keep the set-up in the quantum domain. This seems
rather odd, since there is no obvious justification for this
requirement. More importantly, even for photon num-
bers µ ≪ 1 we find that for sufficiently large loss the
transmission becomes insecure according to the usd at-
tack while the analysis according to the beamsplitting
attack makes us believe that we are dealing with a se-
cure key. It seems that the usd attack is underestimated
since the probability of success in the unambiguous state
discrimination goes with µ3 since only for three or more
photons the four signal states are actually linear indepen-
dent. The beamsplitting attack, however, succeeds with
a probability of order µ2, since already two photons can
be split by the beamsplitter.
This seems to imply that beamsplitting is the more
powerful attack. However, this is not the case since the
two attacks vary in their power differently as the loss of
the system increases. In the usd attack the probability
to identify a signal depends only on the average photon
number µ, and once this probability is high enough to
generate the expected number of signals for the receiver
(which depends on the amount of loss) then the trans-
mission becomes insecure. In the beamsplitting attack,
on the other hand, the total probability of identified sig-
nals psplit depend on µ and on the transmission coeffi-
cient η, and this probability goes down with increasing
loss for fixed µ. And indeed, we find that pexp > psplit.
In other words, the beamsplitting attack becomes less
efficient with increasing loss. This is easy to see in a sim-
ple example of a two-photon signal. The probabilities
p(n, 2 − n) that n = 0, 1, 2 photons arrive at Bob’s de-
tectors and n− 2 photons go to Eve in the beamsplitting
attack are given by
p(0, 2) = (1− η)2, (45)
p(1, 1) = 2η(1− η), (46)
p(2, 0) = η2. (47)
This means, that for high losses (η ≪ 1) most likely
both photons are sent to Eve. Probability of this event
is p(0, 2) ≈ 1 − 2η, while the splitting probability goes
down as p(1, 1) ≈ 2η. The respective probabilities for
n-photon signals are of the same order of magnitude in
η. Therefore, clearly, there is a crossover as a function
of η where for fixed average photon number η the usd
attack is more efficient than the beamsplitting attack.
We would like to stress again that from a technological
point of view the usd attack seems to be easier to im-
plement than the beamsplitting attack. This is based on
two points. Firstly, experience indicates that a complete
measurements destroying the quantum state completely,
as possible by the usd attack, are easier to realize (at
least in some approximation) than the realization of a
quantum channel with reduced loss, as required by the
beamsplitting attack. Secondly, the beamsplitting attack
implies the use of quantum memory, which could store
the split-off signal photons until the polarization bases
for each signal are announced.
Finally we would like to point out again that a security
proof for realistic signals with Poissonian photon number
distribution exists for individual attacks [12] and coher-
ent attacks [13]. Naturally, these security proofs include
the security against the beamsplitting attack and against
the usd attack.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have quantitatively analyzed an attack against re-
alistic quantum crypto systems which enables an eaves-
dropper to gain information on the key without causing
any errors in case of a lossy channel or poor detection ef-
ficiencies. It uses unambiguous discrimination of linearly
independent signal states. This attack does not require
the ability to store quantum states or to perform com-
plicated quantum dynamics. Moreover, the attack does
not require to substitute the lossy quantum channel by a
perfect one.
We have derived a set of conditions which allow to
judge whether a given system can be totally insecure un-
der the usd attack. We have shown a secure parame-
ter regime in terms of the total transmission efficiency
and the mean photon number. In the important limit
of small detection efficiencies ηB we have obtained an
analytic result so that we can give explicitly a set of pa-
rameters (line transmittances, detector efficiencies and
mean photon numbers in coherent states sent by Alice)
for which the transmission is secure/insecure under the
usd attack. In theory, the signal can always be chosen to
be weak enough to allow secure communication. In prac-
tice, however, the detector noise places restrictions on
that end [11]. Finally, we showed that security against
beamsplitting attacks does not necessarily imply secu-
rity against the usd attack. This implies that we need to
search for a better conditional security criterion against
attacks deemed practically with currently available tech-
nology.
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